Title: Three Probabilistic Models for the Epistemology of Perception
Lecturer: Ralph Wedgwood (Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California)
Chairperson: XU Zhu (Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, East China Normal University)
Date: 2 pm, June 4th, 2018 (Monday)
Venue: Room 3102, Building of School of Humanities, Minhang Campus, ECNU
Sponsor: Si-mian Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities, ECNU
Abstract of the Lecture:
Probabilistic approaches to epistemology can give promising accounts of inference, including both deductive and non-deductive inference. But how can these probabilistic approaches be united with a plausible account of the epistemology of perception? There are three main ways of uniting an account of perception with the probabilistic approach: (a) Cartesian model; (b) a model advocated by Timothy Williamson (2000); and (c) a model advocated by Richard Jeffrey (2004). Each of these models faces a problem -- the problem of accounting for the defeasibility of perceptual beliefs and perceptual knowledge. It will be argued that the best way of solving this problem is by relying on (a) the Cartesian model. This model has often been criticized, but it can be defended effectively against all these criticisms.
Brief Introduction of the Lecturer:
Ralph Wedgwood is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern California (USC). Before coming to USC, he taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and at Merton College, University of Oxford. He has got a PhD of Philosophy from Cornell University. He is the author of The Nature of Normativity (Oxford University Press, 2007) and The Value of Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2017), and of more than 50 articles on various topics in meta-ethics, ethical theory, epistemology, and the theory of practical reason.